An Empirical Analysis of the Buoyancy and Elasticity of Tax in Nigeria by N. I., Ikpeze et al.
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.11, 2016 
 
44 
An Empirical Analysis of the Buoyancy and Elasticity of Tax in 
Nigeria 
 
Ikpeze N. I.      David-Wayas, O. M.      Musa, O. D. 
University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria 
 
Abstract 
Many countries in the world have greatly sponsored their government expenditures with the aid of tax revenue, 
and owe their developments to this internally generated revenue. The rate of increase depends on the elasticity 
and buoyancy of tax and it is on this premise that, this study investigated the elasticity and buoyancy of tax in an 
attempt to ascertain its flexibility and hence the possibility of increasing the tax base in Nigeria. The results of 
the study therefore suggest that aggregate revenue is relatively elastic and significantly buoyant according to the 
2004 tax reforms. And the results of the four major taxes tested showed that only PPT was found to be relatively 
elastic while VAT, CED and CID were relatively inelastic. However the results further suggest that, while VAT 
and CIT are not significantly buoyant according to the 2004 tax reforms, PPT and CED are significantly buoyant. 
Finally, the study used the 2005 structural break to establish that aggregate tax revenue dropped significantly 
after the boom period. The study therefore concludes that tax in Nigeria is relatively flexible with respect to 
growth and therefore more could be done to increase it.  
Keywords: Tax, tax reform, elasticity, buoyancy, Nigeria. 
 
Background to the Study 
Tax is a major source of government revenue all over the world. Governments use tax proceeds to render their 
traditional functions such as the provision of public goods, maintenance of law and order, defense against 
external aggression, regulation of trade and business to ensure social and economic maintenance (Azubike, 
2009). The economic effects of tax include micro effects on the distribution of income and efficiency of 
resources use as well as macro effect on the level of capacity output, employment, prices and growth (Musgrave 
and Musgrave, 2004). 
Among all the sources of revenue to government, taxation is the most important one. Owing to the 
inherent power of government to impose taxes, the government is assured at all times of its tax revenue no 
matter the circumstances. With modifications as a result of different manifestos of opposing political parties, the 
government’s ability to impose tax is unlimited. It is in this light of the significance of this source of government 
revenue that its assessment, effectiveness and collectivity are paramount for optimum benefit (Effiok, 2006). 
The Nigerian tax system is lopsided, and dominated by oil revenue. The most veritable tax handles are 
under the control of the federal government while the lower tiers are responsible for the less strong ones—the 
federal government taxes corporate bodies while state and local governments’ tax individuals. A major element 
contributing to this development was the prolonged military rule that had ignored constitutional provision. 
During the early stage of the country’s economy, revenues were largely derived from primary products. Between 
1960 and the early 1970s, revenue from agricultural products dominated, while revenue from other sources was 
considered as residual. Since the oil boom of 1973/4 to date, however, oil has dominated Nigeria’s revenue 
profile, thus, indicating that traditional tax revenue has not assumed a strong role in the country’s management of 
fiscal policy. Instead of transforming or diversifying the existing revenue base, fiscal management has merely 
transited from one primary product-based economy to another, making the economy susceptible to fluctuations 
of the international oil market. 
The need to address this problem led to several taxes policy reforms. The tax policy reviews of 1991 
and 2003, as well as the yearly amendments given in the annual budget, were geared towards addressing this 
issue. But not much has been achieved. Perhaps to understand the importance of tax policy reforms, one needs to 
appreciate the urgency for such reforms. Why the need for tax policy reforms in Nigeria? First, there is a 
compelling need to diversify the revenue portfolio for the country in order to safeguard against the volatility of 
crude oil prices and to promote fiscal sustainability and economic viability at lower tiers of government. Second, 
Nigeria operates on a cash budget system, where proposals for expenditure are always anchored to revenue 
projections. This facilitates determining the optimal tax rate for a given level of expenditure. Thus accuracy in 
revenue projection is vital for devising an appropriate framework for sustainable fiscal management, and this can 
be realized only if reforms are undertaken on existing tax policies in order to achieve some improvement. 
Thirdly, the study groups on the review of the Nigerian tax system in 1991 and 2003 highlighted the 
need to increase tax revenue and reduce expenditure as the major fiscal issues to be addressed. As such, the 
primary objective of the committees was to optimize revenue from various sources within the country. Finally, 
the necessity to improve the tax notification procedure was underscored in order to facilitate effective evaluation 
of the performance of the Nigerian tax system and to promote adequate planning and implementation. The 
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quality of management associated with regular and a result-oriented tax reform has a significant bearing on the 
overall macroeconomic performance and the distribution of resources between public and private sectors as well 
as within the public sector. 
Besides, Wagner’s law stipulates that public expenditure is a natural consequence of economic growth 
(Demirbas, 1999). The magnitude of government surplus or deficit is probably the single most important statistic 
measuring the impact of government fiscal policy on an economy (Siegel, 1979). Many developing countries 
including Nigeria in their attempt to increase growth have increased public expenditure but have not been able to 
match this increase with revenue mobilization through taxation and this has resulted in huge fiscal deficit. In the 
case of Nigeria, tax mobilization as a source for financing development activities has been a difficult issue 
primarily because of various forms of resistance such as evasion, avoidance and corrupt practices attending to it. 
These activities are considered as sabotaging the economy and are readily presented as reasons for the 
underdevelopment of the country (Adegbie and Fakile, 2011). Again, the Nigerian tax system has been weak in 
its revenue mobilization due to inadequate data on the tax base and heavy reliance on oil revenue. With the 
volatility in oil prices and excruciating impacts of the recent global financial crises, taxation deserves more 
attention now than ever in Nigeria (Adeleke, 2011). 
An accurate estimate of the optimal level of expenditure requires knowledge of the buoyancy-total 
response of tax revenue to changes in national income and discretionary changes in tax policy over time; and tax 
elasticity- automatic response of tax revenue to GDP changes less the discretionary changes. It assists in 
identifying a sustainable revenue profile for the country and also helps in determining appropriate modifications 
to the existing tax structure and rates as well as areas for improving tax administration. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
Fiscal deficit has become a recurring feature of public sector financing all over the world. Its widespread use is 
partly influenced by the desire of various governments to respond positively to the ever-increasing demands of 
the populace and to enhance accelerated economic growth and development (Ariyo, 1993). This tendency toward 
deficit financing is more pronounced in developing countries where the populace looks to the government for the 
satisfaction of most needs. However, the rising magnitude of this deficit since 1980 in Nigeria is now of great 
concern. An appraisal of the budgetary process in Nigeria shows that annual expenditure proposals are always 
anchored on projected revenue, thus, the accuracy of revenue projection which requires the knowledge of 
buoyancy and elasticity of tax is a necessary condition for devising an appropriate framework for fiscal deficit 
management in Nigeria. 
The federal government of Nigeria (FGN) commenced the implementation of a structural Adjustment 
programme (SAP) in 1986 that amounted to significant structural changes in the macroeconomic management 
framework for the country. One of the core objectives of the SAP is to enhance the degree of self-reliance within 
the economy. Of equal importance is the need to diversify the economy’s revenue base, in order to minimize the 
extent of dependence on oil as the major source of revenue. All these have potential implications for the yield of 
non-oil tax revenue sources. For example, one major consequence of SAP is the rekindled interest in export of 
cash crops such as cocoa. Ordinarily, this should have resulted in a significant upsurge in revenue from export 
duties, but as part of the reform, the FGN scrapped export duties as an element of the package of incentives 
meant to promote exports. There were significant downward revisions in tax rates and import tariffs as well. The 
corporate tax rate was reduced from 45% to 40% in 1987 in order to encourage re-investment activities by 
existing organizations and to encourage new investments. Similarly, import duties on certain categories of 
imports were reviewed. Among these was the elimination of duties on trucks and commercial vehicles to ease 
the transportation problem in the country. Also duty exemptions were granted on items required on some public 
projects. Generous tariff concessions were also allowed on machinery and raw materials that could not be 
sourced locally, at least not in the short run. Several policies having implications for the yield of specific tax 
sources were also initiated to mitigate the negative effect of SAP on the populace. The introduction of SAP 
generated several changes in tax-related policies, so that any growth in GDP during this period might not 
necessarily translate into higher tax yield. The determination of the buoyancy and elasticity of individual main 
taxes therefore becomes an empirical question. 
However, before the above economic reform, the advent of the oil boom in the 1973/74 fiscal year 
encouraged over-reliance on oil revenue to the neglect of traditional revenue sources. As a result, some non-oil 
revenue sources were either abandoned or became of less concern to the government, hence, the need to 
assessing the optimal revenue derivable from these non-oil sources and to equally find out the changes that this 
major experience had brought about.  
The motivation of this study however, is to ascertain the elastic nature of tax and its buoyancy with 
respect to tax reforms. Elasticity of tax in this study measures the proportion of change of tax, with respect to a 
unit change in economic growth. It is the interest of this study to analyze the elasticity of the aggregate tax and 
four of the major taxes. Also the need to improve non-oil proceeds has been on an increase over the years and so 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.11, 2016 
 
46 
many tax reforms have been made to boast tax revenue. This study therefore investigates to what extent the 2004 
tax reform was buoyant to the tax base. 
Based on this background the study seeks to answer the following research questions; 
1. What is the tax buoyancy and elasticity of the total tax revenue in Nigeria? 
2. What is the tax buoyancy and elasticity of the main taxes in Nigeria namely; Company Income Tax, 
Petroleum Profit Tax, Custom and Excise Duties and Value Added Tax (VAT)? 
3. What are the major structural changes in the tax revenue before and after the oil- boom in Nigeria? 
The broad objective of this study is to analyze empirically the buoyancy and elasticity of tax system in 
Nigeria with respect to its efficiency in revenue mobilization in the attempt to address the unsustainable fiscal 
deficit challenge facing the country. 
The specific objectives are: 
1.  To ascertain the tax buoyancy and elasticity of the Total Tax Revenue in Nigeria. 
2. To ascertain the tax buoyancy and elasticity of the main taxes in Nigeria namely; Company Income Tax, 
Petroleum Profit Tax, Custom and Excise Duties and Value Added Tax (VAT). 
3. To investigate the presence of structural change in tax revenue during and after the oil-boom in Nigeria. 
The hypothesis of the study is formally stated in its null form while the alternative is implied. 
Ho1: The total tax revenue in Nigeria is not significantly buoyant. 
Ho2: Tax revenue of the main taxes in Nigeria with respect to GDP growth are not significantly buoyant. 
Ho3: There is no significant structural change in tax revenue between the pre and post oil-boom era in Nigeria. 
 
Significance of the Study 
An accurate estimation of the optimal level of expenditure requires knowledge of the buoyancy and elasticity of 
the tax system. The study will help the government to know if they are keeping track on tax revenue 
mobilization with respect to GDP growth. Additionally, estimation of individual tax buoyancy and elasticity 
would help the policy makers especially the fiscal authorities to identify those taxes which are income elastic or 
otherwise and therefore aim at directing their efforts at the more elastic ones to raise overall tax revenue and 
making sure that the inelastic ones become elastic. Besides, the estimation of decomposed buoyancy into the pre 
and post oil- boom era helps to shed more light on the weaknesses and strengths of the system that existed before 
and what pertains today. This also helps the tax authorities in identifying issues that need improvement and 
restructuring in the Nigerian tax system. 
Finally, to academicians, this work will serve as a reference point for further research and consequently 
add to the existing stock of literature in public sector Economics. 
 
The scope of the study 
This study investigates empirically the buoyancy and elasticity of the Nigerian tax system (that is, the efficiency 
of tax system in terms of its revenue mobilization capacity with respect to GDP) from 1980-2011 bearing in 
mind the effect of the 2004 major tax reform in Nigeria to determine the buoyancy as the tax base experienced 
changes. Four major taxes were considered namely; Company Income Tax, Petroleum Profit Tax, Custom and 
Excise Duties and Value Added Tax (VAT). It also incorporates the behavior of tax system before and after oil- 
boom in Nigeria. The core variable of interest are; National income, Government expenditure, External Grant, 
Non-Tax Revenue, Budget Deficit and Inflation as the control variable. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Every country in the process of formulating its budget undertakes revenue projections. When the revenues turn 
out to be smaller than the budget expenditures, countries end up with deficit financing. Since underdeveloped 
countries have few possibilities for prolonged external financing of budget deficits, without causing too much 
disruption in the macroeconomic environment, each country must decide how best to increase its internal tax 
revenues to meet its expenditure needs. One way that countries raise additional revenue is by making 
discretionary tax measure changes. The best outcome expected from such changes is that the tax system will 
automatically yield corresponding tax revenues as income or GDP grows, on a sustainable basis. 
 
Elasticity of Tax 
Tax elasticity is the ratio of the percentage change in tax revenue to the percentage change in income or GDP, 
assuming that no discretionary changes have been made in the tax rate or tax base. It is defined as: 
 
Where: ETY = Elasticity of tax revenue to income or GDP, 
∆T = Change in tax revenue, and ∆Y = Change in income GDP. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.11, 2016 
 
47 
Mirambo (2001), Elasticity measures the responsiveness of tax revenue to changes in national income if 
the tax structure would have remained unchanged. To estimate elasticity of any tax system, revenue series have 
to be corrected for the effects of discretionary changes in tax policy. 
Mansfield (1972) argues that automatic growth in tax revenue alone, abstracting from discretionary 
changes, is the elasticity of the tax. High tax elasticity, that is, a tax elasticity coefficient of one or more, is said 
to be particularly desirable since it allows growth in expenditure to be financed by raising tax revenue without 
recourse to the politically unpopular decision to raise tax rates. 
Tsegaye (1993) says that a high elasticity may simply reflect the progressiveness of the tax structure, 
showing positive ratios of tax revenues to increases in income. A high elasticity (that is greater than unity) 
implies that the tax revenue increases faster than the income. This means if the tax is meant to maximize revenue, 
the government could rely on more elastic taxes which do not require frequent discretionary changes. It is 
therefore essential that the tax elasticity be equal to or exceeds unity to maximize revenue. 
 
Tax Buoyancy 
The buoyancy of tax measures the responsiveness of tax revenue to changes in income without controlling for 
the discretionary changes in tax policy. The discretionary changes are the changes which result in more tax 
revenue from the same tax base. The sources of such changes are changes in tax legislation or changes in the tax 
rate (Osoro 1993) 
Jayasundera (1991) explains that the buoyancy of a tax system reflects the total response of tax revenue 
to changes in national income as well as effects of discretionary changes in tax policies over time. Matundu 
(1995) adds to the view of Jayasundera that a buoyancy coefficient which is greater than one would imply that 
for every one percent increase in GDP, tax revenue increases by more than one percent. 
 
Tax Reforms in Nigeria 
The Nigerian tax reform has experienced series of reforms since 1904 to date. The effects of the various reforms 
in the country is as follows: Introduction of income tax in Nigeria between 1904 and 1926; grant of autonomy to 
the Nigerian Inland Revenue in 1945; the Raisman Fiscal Commission of 1957; formation of the Inland Revenue 
Board in 1958; the promulgation of the petroleum profit tax ordinance No. 15 of 1959; the promulgation of 
Income Tax Management Act 1961; establishment of the Lagos State Inland Revenue Department; the 
promulgation of the companies Income Tax Act (CITA) 1979; establishment of the Federal Board of Internal 
Revenue Service between 1991 and 1992; and tax policy and administration reforms amendment 2001 and 2004. 
The government embarked upon the latest tax reform process by instituting study group on the Nigerian Tax 
System, consisting of individuals from business, academia, and the government to study the present tax laws and 
recommend the appropriate reform in general and their impact to the overall economy. As a result of the reform, 
nine (9) bills on tax reforms where approved by the Federal Executive Council for the consideration of the 
National Assembly and subsequently passed as Act. The Acts, are as enumerated as follows: Federal Inland 
Revenue Service Act 2004; companies Income Tax Act 2004; Petroleum Profit Tax Act 2004; Personal Income 
Tax Act 2004; Value Added Act 2004; Education Tax Act 2004; Customs, Excise Tariffs, etc (consolidation) 
Act 2004; National Sugar Development Act 2004; and National Automotive Council Act 2004. 
The Chartered Institute of Taxation of Nigeria (CITN), established in 1982 and Chartered by Act No. 
76 of 1992 to regulate tax practice and administration in the country, and to this extent a major stakeholder in the 
Nigerian tax system submitted a memorandum on the proposed 2004 amendment. Their memorandum objectives 
include: to strengthen the powers of the Accountant General of the federation to monitor the revenue being 
generated by ministries, extra-ministerial departments and parastatals; to enforce remittance of the revenues 
collected to the consolidated revenue fund or federation account; to strengthen the oversight functions of the 
National Assembly in monitoring the revenue generated by ministries, and others; to increase the penalty for 
under declaration of revenue generated from three to five years. 
 
Personal Income Tax (Ammendment) Act 2011 ( Pitam) 
An Act, Personal Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 2011 was enacted to amend the Personal Income Tax Act, Cap. 
P8. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004 and related matters. The Bill seeks to amend the provisions of 
the Principal Act, Personal Income Tax Act, Cap. P8. LFN 2004, by substituting the existing Sixth Schedule 
with the new Sixth Schedule. It was signed into law on 14 June 2011 but only announced during the budget 
presentation by the President on 13 December 2011. 
 
Key Changes 
The highlights of the New Personal Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 2011 are as follows: 
· Gross income is defined to include benefits in kind, gratuities, superannuation and any other incomes derived 
solely by reason of employment. 
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· Principal place of residence to include places where branch offices and operational site of companies are 
situated. 
· Operational sites are defined in the bill to include oil terminals, oil platforms, flow stations, construction sites, 
etc with a minimum of 50 workers. 
· Any individual irrespective of status who works in more than one state for at least 20 days in at least 3 months 
of every assessment year will be liable to tax in such a state. 
· Full tax exemption to be granted on interest from bonds issued by Federal, State and Local Governments and 
their Agencies, corporate entities and interest earned on short term securities. 
· Interest for default in tax remittance to be charged at the prevailing minimum re-discount rate of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria on an annual basis. 
· Individual tax clearance certificates (TCC) to be required for any change of ownership of vehicles and 
application for land title transfer or perfection. 
· 1% bonus which was previously given to early filers of tax returns has been abolished. 
· Amendment to Section 33 is a new insertion to introduce a presumptive tax regime to bring in those in the 
informal sector to the Tax Net. The section highlights the fact that “There will be a consolidated tax free 
allowance of N200, 000 or 1% of gross income whichever is higher plus 20% of the gross income, the balance of 
income shall be taxed as specified in the new graduated tax table.” 
· Amendment to Section 37 is a new insertion to increase the Minimum Tax rate payable from 0.5% to 1% of 
gross income since the threshold has increased from N30,000 to N300,000 in conformity with the tax table in the 
schedule to the Bill. 
· Section 52 introduces stiffer criminal penalties for non-compliance. Penalty for late filing of returns is now 
N500,000 for corporate bodies and N50,000 for individuals. 
· Amendment to Section 73 is to create a refund mechanism. “Introduction of WHT refund mechanism. The 
excess WHT will be refunded within 90 days or granted as future tax credits” 
· Section 80 New PAYE filing requirement: It is mandatory for employers of labour to file returns of their 
employees not later than 31 January of every year; showing all the emoluments paid to its employees in the 
preceding year. 
· Tax officers to apply for a warrant from the High Court before levying any distress on a taxpayer. 
· “itinerant worker” previously defined to mean an individual who works at any time during a year of assessment 
(other than as a member of the armed forces) for a daily wage or customarily earns his livelihood in more than 
one place in Nigeria and whose total income does not exceed N 600; to be modified as follows: 
· “itinerant worker includes an individual irrespective of his status who works at any time in any state during a 
year of assessment (other than as a member of the armed forces) for wages, salaries or livelihood by working in 
more than one state for a minimum of twenty (20) days in at least three (3) month of every assessment year. The 
relevant tax authorities are empowered to collect taxes from itinerant worker.” 
· Place of Residence for an itinerant worker has been amended thus: “in the case of an individual who works in 
the branch office or operational site of a company or other body corporate, the place at which the branch office 
or operation site is situated: Provided that operational site shall include Oil Terminals, Oil Platforms, Flow 
Stations, Factories, Quarries, Construction Site with a minimum of fifty (50) workers etc”. 
 
Empirical Studies 
Empirical literature exists on tax revenue and reforms in a sizeable number. However, this study narrows its 
focus on the buoyancy and elasticity of tax. Some of the research been carried out on buoyancy and elasticity of 
tax are reviewed in this section. 
Osoro (1993) study on the revenue productivity of the tax system in Tanzania for the period 1969-1990 
showed a low elasticity for the total tax system, as well as for individual taxes. 
Ole (1975) estimated income elasticity of tax structure of Kenya for the period 1962-1972. Tax revenue 
was regressed on income without adjusting for the unusual observations. The results showed that the tax 
structure was income inelastic with an index of 0.81 for the period studied. 
Choudhry (1979) estimated the elasticity of tax revenue of the United States, United Kingdom, 
Malaysia and Kenya. The overall elasticity were 1.04 and 1.24 for the United States and United Kingdom 
respectively. Malaysia and Kenya had slightly higher elasticity of 1.57 and 32 respectively. Estimation of the 
buoyancy revealed that in the United States and the United Kingdom, revenue reducing discretionary changes in 
income taxation contributed to the low buoyancy and elasticity, while in Malaysia and Kenya, revenue 
increasing DTMs contributed to the comparatively higher buoyancy and elasticity. 
 In the similar view, Mtatifikolo (1990); Njoroge (1993); Kusi (1998);Milambo (2001) and Graeser 
(2004), in their respective studies showed that generally, broad consumption taxes usually show elasticity 
slightly less and part of this can be explained by the specific nature of the individual economy. 
Twerefou et al (2009) revealed that the overall tax system in Ghana was buoyant and elastic in the long 
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run and buoyancy exceeded the elasticity, but in the short run the reverse was the case. They also observed an 
improvement in both buoyancy and elasticity over the reform period. 
Milwood, T.T (2012) Studied the relationship between GDP growth and the growth in tax revenue as 
well as the responsiveness of taxes to fiscal policy in Jamaica. The study observed that discretionary tax 
measures have had an overall impact on growth in total revenue over the period. However, the automatic 
response of revenue to changes in the base was found to be less than unity. 
Omorugi (1983) did a comprehensive assessment of the productivity of the Nigerian tax system. He 
evaluated the buoyancy of the tax system as defined by Sahota (1961) and Ghai (1966) for the period 1960 to 
1979. He focused on both the indirect taxes such as import, export and excise duties, as well as direct taxes such 
as personal income tax (federally collected) and petroleum profit tax. He discovered a general satisfaction on the 
level of tax productivity in Nigeria during the period under review. 
Ariyo (1997) in his study of the productivity of the Nigerian tax system improved upon the one done by 
Omrugi (1983) in the following respects. First, the study covered the period 1960-1990, and therefore updates 
the analysis. Second, the study captured the impact of the structural changes in macroeconomic management 
framework introduced since 1966. Third, Omoruyi (1983) disaggregated his analysis in terms of decades (1960-
1967, 1970-1980, etc). His research findings were as follows: For the period covered by the study, there was an 
elasticity of 1.18 for government tax revenue relative to GDP. The non-oil component, however, had a lower 
elasticity coefficient of 0.94, while the performance of import duties (IMD) showed the same pattern. The 
cumulative effect of the oil boom PPT (petroleum profit tax) was reflected with an elasticity of 2.60 and 1.51 in 
relation to GDP. He also found out that company income tax was elastic with an elasticity coefficient of 1.21, 
which suggests an improved efficiency in tax collection from this source over the years. 
 
Model Specifications 
Estimation of Tax Elasticity and Buoyancy 
This study captures elasticity and buoyancy based on their definitions as stated above. Tax elasticity is defined as 
“the ratio of the percentage change in tax revenue to the percentage change in income or GDP”, this therefore 
implies that tax elasticity is the coefficient of GDP/Income on tax revenue, both for individual taxes and for the 
total tax revenue. “In empirical works an elasticity is the estimated coefficient in a linear regression equation 
where both the dependent variable and the independent variable are in natural logs. Elasticity is a popular tool 
among empiricists because it is independent of units and thus simplifies data analysis” (Wikipedia 2013). 
The coefficient of the GDP describes elasticity and it is defined thus 
Table 1: Types of elasticity and designations 
Alternative  Coefficient (E) 
Perfectly Elastic E= ∞ 
Relatively Elastic (more than proportionate change) 1 < E < ∞ 
Unit Elastic (equal proportional change) E=1 
Relatively Inelastic (Less than proportionate change) 0 < E< 1 
Perfectly Inelastic E = 0 
While Tax Buoyancy is defined as “a measurement of the responsiveness of tax revenue to changes in 
income without controlling for the discretionary changes in tax policy. The discretionary changes are the 
changes which result in more tax revenue from the same tax base. The sources of such changes are changes in 
tax legislation or changes in the tax rate” which suggests that the dummy variable for tax reforms of 2004 
captures discretional changes in the tax base, hence the buoyancy. 
 
Model Specification of the objectives of the study 
In line with the major focus of this study which is to investigate the buoyancy and elasticity of tax system in 
Nigeria with respect to its efficiency in revenue mobilization vis-à-vis the changes in National Income (NI), thus, 
we assume aggregate revenue to be a homogenous function of NI. Putting this in a more sophisticated procedure 
where economic theory suggests equilibrium relationship among aggregate revenue and the national income; 
there are several forms of these equilibrium relations to hold using these variables, hence a motivation for a 
system of equations. Also in recognition of the deterministic trend (denoted with h) of fiscal policy instrument, 
we formulate the model for the estimation of objective 1, that is, the buoyancy  and elasticity of tax estimate with 
respect to national income in the following standard regression technique equation; 
t 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1  + + ....(1)
k
t t t t t t t t tARV Z NI GX NTR XG INF D hα θ φ φ φ φ φ ψ ε= + + + + + + +  
Where  
ARV = Aggregate Tax Revenue 
NI = National Income (GDP) 
GX = Government Expenditure 
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NTR = Non-Tax Revenue 
XG = External Grant 
INF = Inflation rate 
Dt = Dummy variable for tax reforms (where 0= 1980-2003 and 2004-2011) 
Z = total base of tax k at time t; 
θ = the elasticity of tax base with respect to national income 
h = deterministic trend, since most fiscal policy instrument are trending; 
ε = stochastic error terms. 
Equation 1 estimates the buoyancy and elasticity of aggregate tax revenue with respect to national income. 
However, estimating the individual taxes revenue in terms of buoyancy and elasticity (as given in objective 2), 
we develop the following equations. 
t 10 11 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 1  + .......(2)
k
t t t t t j tPIT Z NI EP TW INF RER BD Dα φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ ε−= + + + + + + + +  
t 20 21 1 22 25 26 27 2  + ..............................(3)
k
t t t j tCIT Z NI INT CDB Dα φ φ φ φ φ ε−= + + + + +   
t 30 31 1 32 33 35 36 37 3  + ............................(4)
k
t t t t j tPPT Z NI BD RER RCO Dα φ φ φ φ φ φ ε−= + + + + + +  
t 40 41 1 42 43 45 46 47 3  + ...............................(5)
k
t t t t j tED Z NI BD RER TPR Dα φ φ φ φ φ φ ε−= + + + + + +  
t 50 51 1 52 53 54 55 56 5  + ...........................(6)
k
t t t t t j tCED Z NI BD RER IMP Dα φ φ φ φ φ φ ε−= + + + + + +  
t 60 61 1 62 63 64 65 66 67 6  + .................(7)
k
t t t t t j tVAT Z NI BD BOT INF CS Dα φ φ φ φ φ φ φ ε−= + + + + + + +  
All equations (1 to 7) were linearized to ascertain the elasticity given that elasticity in regression coefficients are 
the estimated coefficients where both the dependent variable and the independent variable are in natural logs.  
Where 
PIT = Personal Income Tax 
CIT = Company Income Tax 
PPT = Petroleum Profit tax 
ET = Education Tax 
CED = Custom & excise Duties, and 
VAT = Value Added Tax  
INF = Inflation rate 
BD = Budget deficit 
RER = Real exchange rate 
BOT = Balance of trade 
EP       = Employed Population 
TW      = Total Wage 
CDB     = Cost of doing Business 
RCO    = Revenue from crude oil 
TPR     = Total production revenue 
IMP     = Import 
CS       = Company sales 
Dt = Dummy variable for discretionary changes (tax reforms). 
Z = the tax base of tax k at time t. 
However for the purpose of normalization and identification of the co-integrating relationships among the 
variables, the error estimates of equations 1 can be derived as; 
1 t 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
 -  + + ....(8)k
t t t t t t t t j
ARV Z NI GX NTR XG INF D hε α θ φ φ φ φ φ ψ = + + + + + +   
By incorporating the Dynamic OLS (DOLS) with lags of both the dependent and explanatory variables, also a 
deterministic trend is usually included, and then it is directed to obtain disequilibrium deviations. The buoyancy 
and elasticity equations can be adjusted by a transformation of the index to determine the elasticity of the tax 
yield by ensuring that the optimal lag order is determined. In the case of equations 1 above we would define a 
vector, where all variables are in lags. 
t 10 t-1 11 1 12 1 13 1 14 1 15 1
16 1 17 1 1 1
  + + +
( ) ....................................................................................(9)
k
t t t t t
t i j t t t
ARV ARV Z NI GX NTR XG
INF D D h
α ρ θ φ φ φ φ
φ ψ ε
− − − − −
− − −
= + + +
+ + + + +
 
However, the identification of lag length is not without a problem, but in order to solve this problem, we 
examine the possible main lag selection statistics (criterions), which are the Final Prediction Error (FPE), the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and the Hannan-Quinn Information 
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Criterion (HQIC). Here, AIC and SBC are the most popularly applied, which usually the SBC favours a lower 
lag order while the AIC is the typical standard for determination of the lag order and is adopted for this model. 
To achieve this, we first of all, calculate the above criterion and determine the log likelihood estimate of the 
underlying model as; 
1
1
1
 T[ln ln(2 ) ]
2
n
t
i
LL Y K K
−
=
= − Π −∑  -------------------------------------------------------------------- (10) 
Where T is the total number of observations, K is the number of variables (Equations), 
1
1
n
t
i
Y
−
=
∑ is the maximum 
likelihood estimate of 
!( )t tE ε ε the vector of residuals in equations (9) that has the dimension K x 1. The LL can 
be obtained after fitting the model at any lag order level. The procedure is to run a number of model estimation 
with lag order from one to a defined maximum subject to the data frequency and the sample size. In quarterly 
data for example, a lag order of more than 12 (three years) would be too high for a sample of 100 observations, a 
lag order of 8 would be more suitable as a maximum lag order, the statistics provided below are different lag 
order equations; 
( )1 2 p pLR LL LL −= − ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (10a) 
2
 2 P
pLL
AIC
T T
  = − +   
   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ (10b) 
k
R
T m
FPE
T m
+ =  − 
∑ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (10c) 
ln( )
2 P
LL T
SBC p
T T
   = − +   
   
------------------------------------------------------------------------- (10d) 
2ln(ln )
2 p
LL T
HQIC P
T T
   = − +   
   
------------------------------------------------------------------- (10e) 
With the specified lags order equations, our previous equations (9) would now be augmented by p numbers of 
lags and inclusion of a deterministic trend as given in equation (11) below: 
( ) ( )1 11t t-i
1
  +
p
i t
i
ARV NI tα φ δ ε
−
= + +∑  -------------------------------------------------- (11) 
Following the Engle – Granger representation theorem, if the I ~ I(1) non-stationary variables are co-integrated 
then an Error Correction Model represents these variables. In first differences the VECM would take the form of: 
( ) ( ) ( )01 11t t-i t-i
1
  +
p
i t
i
ARV ARV ARV tα φ δ ε
−
∆ = ∏ + ∆ + +∑ -------------------------- (12) 
Where ( )
t-i
ARV∏  is obtained since ( ) ( ) ( )
1t t t-1
ARV AVR AVR∆ = −  
And ∏  is a square matrix with dimensions equal to the number of variables in the system and is 
known as Matrix of Long – Run Multipliers, the “dynamic” or “impact parameters” matrix. It is clear that under 
the presence of co-integration, the “stationary VEC” in differences is miss-specified, the difference is obvious in 
the lack of the matrix of Long – Run multipliers.  
To solve this problem we adopt Co-integration Ranks by applying Johansen reduce rank tests to 
estimate the number of LR relations. Johansen (1995) showed that the number of co-integration relations is 
determined by the rank of the dynamic matrix ∏ with the dimension of k x k and has a reduced rank in the 
presence of co-integration which has a rank of zero if there is no co-integration, hence the rank r of ∏  is 0 ≤ r ≤ 
m, m < k. 
Rank of a matrix is the number of linearly independent columns or rows. The linearly independent 
relations are the LR relationships among our variables expressed in the rank of the dynamic LR matrix, hence the 
importance and convenience of the Johansen approach. This is how Johansen procedure is clever. To determine 
this ranks, Johansen introduced the well-known ‘Trace’ and ‘Maximal Eigenvalue’ statistics of characteristic 
roots test for the number of co-integration relations and reported their critical values obtained using a Monte 
Carlo simulation. This will automatically be run in the STATA version 11.0 adopted for this analysis. 
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Model Specification for Objective 3 
In order to estimate the 3rd objective of this study, we incorporate the presence of a technical change, which 
results in a change in the tax yield (output) due to the combined effect of growth in the tax bases (factor inputs) 
and a shift in the curve caused by such a change. This can be derived with dummy model technique in the 
following way: 
t 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6
1 7
  + + ( )
. . . . . (1 3 )
k
t t t t t i t
t t
A R V Z N I G X N T R X G D
I N F
α θ φ φ φ φ φ
φ ν
= + + + +
+
Where the dummy variable Di is defined such that D = 1, for the period of oil boom, 0 for period before oil boom. 
In this model the estimation of aggregate tax revenue after the oil boom is given as; 
{ }t 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
17
, 1   + + ( )kt t t t t i t
t t
E ARV D Z NI GX NTR XG D
INF
α θ φ φ φ φ φ
φ ν
= = + + + +
+
------------------- (14) 
All the variables remained as defined above. Note that, if there is no technical change or discretionary measure 
the given structure of tax revenue remains unchanged, and the estimate for structural model given before the oil 
boom is given as; 
{ }t 10 11 12 13 14 15 16, 0   + +kt t t t t tE ARV D Z NI GX NTR XG INFα θ φ φ φ φ φ= = + + + + ------------------- (15) 
With the help of equations 14 & 15 above, the study will ascertain if there are changes in the structure of tax 
revenue, and if there is, the models will direct us on the sources of the structural changes. 
To capture the boom period dummy, the study used the Zivot Andrews unit root test that has the 
potential of detecting the most severe structural break during the period of study. 
 
Justification of the Models Specified  
The study adopted the standard OLS estimation procedure which was modified into Dynamic OLS (DOLS) and 
was incorporated in vector error correction model (VECM) model. According to the proposition of Sobel and 
Holcombe (1996), these ideas correct for the shortfalls of the OLS model. The shortfall of the OLS coefficient 
estimates relate to asymptotically biased coefficient estimates and the inconsistency of the standard errors in the 
presence of non-stationary variables. Again, the Divisia Index (DI) approach was introduced to estimate the 
buoyancy and elasticity of tax revenues.  
As rightly noted in Toni-Anne and Milwood (2012), this method seeks to separate the effect on total 
revenue of the (i) discretionary measures and (ii) the built-in response of tax revenues to the growth in GDP. 
With DOLS and VEC, the effects of discretionary tax measures are removed from total revenue growth using an 
index that isolates the automatic growth in revenue. Next, the buoyancy is estimated with respect to GDP by a 
standard regression technique. Lastly, the estimated buoyancy is adjusted by a transformation of the index to 
determine the elasticity of the tax yield. And this methods will separate discretionary measures from the built-in 
responsiveness of tax revenue to growth include the proportional adjustment method, the constant rate structure 
method and the dummy variable method. Besides, the variance decomposition as an aspect of VAR/VECM is 
one of the most popular techniques for capturing the impulse responses and transmission of shocks among the 
variables. 
 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.11, 2016 
 
53 
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
Table 2: Unit Root results for all Variables 
Variables Trend/Or not No of 
lags 
Order of      
stationarity 
Stationary critical 
value 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Trend 0 I(2) 1% 
Aggregate tax revenue  No trend 4 I(2) 5% 
Government expenditure Trend 8 I(2) 5% 
Oil revenue Trend 8 I(0) 5% 
External grant (ODA) No Trend 0 I(0) 5% 
company income tax Trend 2 I(1) 1% 
VAT Trend 0 I(1) 1% 
Exchange rate No trend 4 I(2) 5% 
Petroleum income tax Trend 0 I(1) 1% 
Prime lending rate No trend 0 I(1) 1% 
Inflation rate No trend 0 I(1) 1% 
Custom duties tax Trend 1 I(1) 1% 
Import Trend 0 I(2) 1% 
Terms of trade Trend 0 I(1) 1% 
Lag of total tax Trend 0 I(1) 1% 
Lag of company income tax  Trend 2 I(1) 1% 
Lag of petroleum tax Trend 0 I(1) 1% 
Lag of custom ex duties  No Trend 0 I(1) 1% 
Lag of VAT Trend 0 I(1) 1% 
Residual for total tax Trend  0 Not stationary  
Residual for CIT Trend 0 Not stationary  
Residual for VAT Trend  0 Not stationary  
Residual for PPT Trend 0 Not stationary  
Residual for CED Trend 0 Not stationary  
The above table shows us that most of the variables had unit roots and hence were not stationary, 
thereby requesting for differencing to make them stationary. However Oil revenue and external grant were 
stationary at level form. While the others were I(1) and I(2) process. The fact that there exists unit root for most 
of the variables is a necessary condition for co-integration. Co-integration is aimed at testing the long –run 
relationship of the variables, wherein if it is validated then it means there is a problem that needs to be corrected 
with the error correction model. Surprisingly in this study, the co-integration test which is the unit root test of the 
residuals of each regression suggests that there exist no co-integration in any of the regressions. This therefore 
implies that the sufficient condition for an error correction model is not satisfied; therefore we conclude that 
there exists no long-run relationship amongst the variables. 
 
Regression results of Aggregate tax 
To achieve objective one, which is to investigate the elasticity and buoyancy of aggregate tax in Nigeria with 
respect to GDP, we ran the regression as specified in equation 1. However the study first of all tests for linearity 
of the dependent and explanatory variables as prescribed by the assumptions of the classical linear theory. To be 
able to do this, the researcher drew scatter plot of the dependent variable – aggregate tax against its residual and 
the outcome is shown on the figure below. 
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Figure 9: Scatter plot of Aggregate tax against its residual 
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The scatter plot above shows a 45 degree line pattern of the dependent variable and the residual hence 
suggesting that there exist a linear relationship between aggregate tax and its explanatory variables therefore 
validating the assumption of linearity for the regression whose results are stipulated below. 
Table 3: Regression results for aggregate tax and its determinants 
Variables Coefficients of determinants 
lag1totaltax 0.295** 
 (2.89) 
Realgdp 1.124 
 (0.38) 
Govexp 0.0745 
 (0.23) 
oilrevenue 0.447 * 
 (2.23) 
extgrantna~a -53520.98 
 (-0.45) 
inflation -1858.5 
 (-0.30) 
Taxrefdummy 3219970.5*** 
 (6.89) 
_cons -257965.9 
 (-0.40) 
N 31 
R square 0.9868 
Durbin Watson 2.683756 
F- probability 0.0000 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The regression result above suggests that the overall significance of the model is good as the F 
probability is very low (0.0000), and the R2 is equally very high (0.9868) suggesting that 98.68% of the 
dependent variable are explained by the explanatory variables. Also there exists no positive or negative strong 
auto-correlation in the regression since the Durbin Watson statistic (2.63) falls in the zone of indecision.  
The main objective from this result is to ascertain the elasticity of aggregate tax with respect to the 
gross domestic product which is given by the coefficient of GDP (having linearized aggregate demand and GDP). 
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The degree of responsiveness of tax with respect to GDP is therefore given as 1.124. According to table 3, 
1.124>1 implies that the responsiveness of tax with respect to a change in tax is relatively elastic. Though the 
elasticity is close to 1, the study opines that policies aimed at increasing the tax base can seriously consider 
increasing aggregate tax to some extend since it’s relatively elastic. This is important to Nigeria, given that over 
the years efforts have been made to improve on internally generated revenue. Aggregate tax can therefore 
accommodate an increase at least to some extent.  
To ascertain the buoyancy of tax this study considered the 2004 tax reforms and stipulated a dummy to 
capture the structural break. The dummy variable is significant up to 99.9% confident interval thereby suggesting 
that aggregate tax was significantly buoyant to the tax reforms of 2004. This also implies that many more vision 
designed policies like such could be designed to improve the tax base of the economy. Apart from the main 
objective this result further show that the previous’ year’s tax is a positively significant determinant of current 
year’s aggregate tax. This is expected given that, Nigeria like many other African/developing countries produces 
their budgets based on last year’s income, and so targets are often set just a little above the previous year’s figure 
and not based on the country’s needs and wants.     
Also, government expenditure and real GDP are not significant while oil revenue is a significant 
determinant of aggregate tax in Nigeria. However they are all positively and directly related to aggregate tax. 
This implies that government expenditure is not focused on taxable institutions and organizations which should 
ordinarily turnaround to generate revenue through tax. In addition gross domestic product also is not 
significantly based on tax in Nigeria due to the country’s overdependence on oil. While Oil revenue is shown to 
be a significant determinant of aggregate tax since most of the oil revenue mainly due to the large use of oil 
revenue in driving the economy. As Nigeria is still a major importer of refined crude and so oil revenue can 
better stimulate aggregate tax if well harnessed. 
Furthermore, inflation and external grants are equally not significant but have a negative and inverse 
relationship with the aggregate tax of Nigeria. This implies that as tax inflation increases aggregate tax drops 
though this is not significant. This could be attributed to the fact that as inflation rises, some firms may close 
down hence reducing the amounts that would have been collected from them as tax. Also external grant or 
official development assistance tends to have an inverse relationship with aggregate tax and could be explained 
by the fact that most of these grants are usually not taxed, and some of these grants (such as health aids) reduces 
the private firms that would have sold the health facilities and hence the tax that would have been gotten. A good 
example is the huge sums of money that have been pumped into Africa and Nigeria in particular to eradicate 
malaria which is most times converted as mosquito nets and hence relegates traders that are involved in mosquito 
nets. 
 
Regression results of the four major types of tax 
The second objective of this study is aimed at investigating the elasticity and buoyancy of the four major taxes as 
designed by the scope. This section will use the same procedure as above, but only this time it will be the 
different main taxes. However we test for the linearity of all the four taxes as dependent variables and their 
residuals. 
Figure 10: Scatter Plots of CED, PPT, CIT and VAT and their residuals 
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The figure above represents the scatter plots of the four major taxes under consideration which include; 
the custom and excise duties, company income tax, petroleum profit tax and value added tax against their various 
residuals. The four graphs depicts a 45 degree line pattern sloping from left to right which is what is normally 
expected of a linear trend. This therefore suggests that all the taxes tested above are linearly related to their 
explanatory variables and therefore validates the linearity assumption of the classical linear theory. Based on this 
result therefore the researcher can further regress the equations while testing for the other assumptions of the 
classical linear theory. 
The table below therefore portrays the result of the regressions for all four taxes mentioned above. The 
table shows their coefficients, t-values, R squares and the F probabilities.  
Table 4: Regression results for VAT, CIT, PPT and CED 
          (1)         (2)             (3)              (4)    
Variables         VAT      CIT PPT CED    
Terms of trade 0.0218 
 (1.42) 
Interest rate -4610.6 -1534.2 
 (-1.28) (-1.40) 
Tax reform dummy -104694.1 19756.0 -335894.0*     -69161.4*   
 (-2.01) (0.69) (-2.48)     (-2.22)    
Real GDP     0.796*** 0.291* 2.159***     0.447*   
     (6.48)  (2.65) (3.86)     (2.23)    
Lag1CIT  0.589*** 
  (4.77) 
lag1PPT    -0.145 
     (-0.66) 
Real exchange rate   1181.9     146.4    
   (1.96)     (1.09)    
Oil revenue   0.0524 
   (2.05) 
lag1CED      0.425    
       (1.60)    
Import        -0.00179    
         (-0.39)    
_cons -130461.4 -39863.1 -518434.8**     -97773.3    
 (-1.90) (-1.59) (-3.53)     (-2.03)    
N         18     31 31          31    
Durbin Watson 1.993072    2.127995     1.479792     2.308298 
R square      0.9608    0.9664     0.9149     0.9442 
F probability      0.0000    0.0000     0.0000     0.00000 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The result above suggests very significant models for all the taxes, given that the F probability remains 
0.0000 for all four of them therefore implying that the overall model is highly significant. Also their R2 is very 
high as all of them are above 91% which implies that they are all highly explained by the determinants. The 
Durbin Watson statistic shows that there exist no autocorrelation for VAT and CIT while PPT and CED falls in 
the zone of indecision. This therefore implies that none of them are either positively or negatively auto correlated. 
The major objective however is to ascertain the elasticity and the buoyancy of these taxes. Surprisingly 
unlike the aggregate tax, three of the taxes have their GDP coefficients lying between zero and one. This 
therefore suggests that VAT, CID and CED are all relatively inelastic and implies that they have a little 
proportionate change with respect to a unit change in GDP. Hence policies designed to increase or decrease these 
tax bases should be neglected, this is because the result proposes that a change in GDP will not over-change the 
tax volume of VAT, CID and CED. On the other hand petroleum profit tax (PPT) is relatively elastic, given that 
the coefficient of GDP is as high as 2.159 which is higher than the elasticity of the aggregate tax. This implies 
that PPT is highly flexible and hence responds with a more than proportionate change to a unit change in GDP. 
Nevertheless what is most interesting and of course expected is that, all taxes tend to increase with increase in 
GDP. 
The test of buoyancy for all four taxes shows that VAT and CIT are not buoyant with respect to the 
2004 tax reforms as their p-values are higher than 0.05 even though the dummy for VAT has a t-value of -2.01. 
While PPT and CED appear to be buoyant with their dummy values for structural break is significant at 95% 
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confidence interval. It is worth noting however that while CIT improved after 2004 (had a positive impact), the 
other taxes- VAT, PPT and CED did not. 
Inferring from the determinants of VAT the result suggests that, terms of trade and interest rate are not 
significant determinants of VAT, while real GDP is significant at 99.9% confidence interval. As expected, 
interest rate has an inverse relationship with VAT. This could be explained by the fact that as interest rate (prime 
lending rate) falls more firms and industries will be motivated to produce (add value in all forms) and hence 
improving the VAT. On the other hand, terms of trade is positively related to VAT, implying that as terms of 
trade increases VAT equally increases. While the regression results of company and income tax (CIT) shows that, 
interest rate is still negatively related and not significant in determining CIT. However real GDP and the lag of 
CIT are significant in determining CIT. This therefore implies that the CIT of the previous year is significant in 
determining current CIT which is equally expected as most targets are usually made based on the previous year’s 
amount. Real GDP is equally significant and positive insinuating that an increase in GDP leads to an increase in 
CIT which is a good sign. 
The regression results of petroleum profit tax (PPT) suggest that its lag, real exchange rate and oil 
revenue are all not significant determinants of PPT. However while real exchange rate and oil revenue are 
positively related, the lag of PPT is negatively related. The negative relationship of the lag may be explained by 
the volatility that exists in the oil market which might be later transferred to the tax collected from its proceeds. 
While real GDP and the tax reform dummy are significant determinants of petroleum profit tax. 
The regression results of the custom and excise duties (CED) show that real exchange rate, imports and 
its lag are all not significant determinants, while real GDP and the dummy are both significant determinants at 
95% confidence interval. However, real GDP, real exchange rate and the lag of CED are positively or directly 
related to CED, implying that as they increase, custom and excise duties increase as well. What is most 
surprising is that there exists an inverse relationship between imports as against custom and excise duties. This 
implies that as imports increase custom and excise duties drop which shouldn’t be the case. This could only be 
attributed to the huge corruption that exists in the importation of oil that constitutes a large amount of the 
country’s import. 
 
Regression results of aggregate tax revenue during and after the oil-boom in Nigeria 
To ascertain the significance of the structural break point this research first of all runs a Zivot Andrews unit root 
test on oil revenue to identify the structural break point and hence the oil boom dummy period. 
Figure 11: Zivot Andrews Unit root test for oil revenue 
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The figure above represents the Zivot Andrews unit root graph results and indicates that the structural 
break point was 2005, it is also visible that the boom period experienced before 2005 and a depression
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revenue was witnessed in 2005. The dummy period shall therefore be designed as 1 for 1980-2004 and 0 
assigned to 2005-2011. The same regression for aggregate tax to ascertain if there was a significant structural 
break is therefore presented below. 
Table 5: Regression results for Aggregate tax to determine the oil boom structural change 
 (1) 
Variables Total tax 
lag1totaltax -0.480 
 (-1.93) 
Real GDP 16.97** 
 (3.17) 
Government expenditure 0.0481 
 (0.13) 
External grant naira -407403.5 
 (-2.04) 
Inflation -15186.4 
 (-1.60) 
Oil boom dummy -6071376.7*** 
 (-4.64) 
_cons 11831272.2* 
 (2.44) 
N 31 
R square 0.9687 
F probability 0.0000 
Durbin Watson 2.723316 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 The overall significance of the model is good as the F probability is as low as 0.000, with a high R2 of 
96.87%. Also there exist no positive or negative auto correlations in the model. The oil boom dummy shows that 
it’s significant at 99.9% confidence interval and has an inverse relationship with aggregate tax. This implies that 
after the boom period, aggregate tax fell significantly as compared to the boom period. This therefore 
conjectures that oil revenue was a significant contributor to aggregate tax especially in boom periods.  
 
Summary 
Many countries in the world have greatly sponsored their government expenditures with the aid of tax revenue, 
and owe their developments to this internally generated revenue. Nigeria started off on a good foot with the huge 
agro-production after her independence. However the discovery of crude attracted most investors to the oil sector 
thereby neglecting the other potential sectors that would have stirred up the industrial production and then 
increase tax revenue. The motivation of this study was therefore to find out how flexible tax is in terms of the 
elasticity and buoyancy, in an attempt to improve the tax base and generate more income. The study therefore 
investigates the elasticity and buoyancy of aggregate and four other major taxes with respect to economic growth 
in Nigeria. Also, the study analyzed the flow of oil revenue during and after the boom period. 
To be able to capture these objectives the study uses the 2004 tax reforms to establish a dummy period 
and ascertain the buoyancy, while using the logged coefficient of GDP to aggregate tax and major taxes in order 
to determine the Growth elasticity of tax. For the third objective the study uses the Zivot Andrews structural 
break test to ascertain the most severe structural break of the oil revenue trend, and then uses simple OLS 
regressions with dummy effects to analyze the trend of aggregate tax with respect to the periods during and after 
the boom period.  
The results of this research are far enriching as it suggest that aggregate revenue is relatively elastic. 
This implies that an increase in the GDP will increase tax to a more than proportionate level. Also the tax reform 
of 2004 was highly significant on aggregate tax and therefore infers that aggregate tax is relatively buoyant. The 
same test was done on four major taxes namely; value added tax, custom and excise duties, petroleum profit tax 
and company income tax. Out of the four taxes, only PPT was found to be relatively elastic while the other three 
were found to be relatively inelastic. However the results further suggest that, while VAT and CIT are not 
significantly buoyant according to the 2004 tax reforms, PPT and CED are significantly buoyant. The Zivot 
Andrews structural break unit root test was then used to ascertain the most severe structural break on the oil 
revenue trend and found it to be 2005. Then the study used the 2005 structural break to establish the dummy 
period during and after the oil boom. With the aid of the dummy the study regressed aggregate tax revenue 
against its determinants and the results showed that there was a significant drop in aggregate tax revenue after 
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the boom period. The boom period therefore significantly contributed to aggregate tax revenue in Nigeria. 
 
Policy implications 
Policy implications from the study abound based on the findings. The results of the first objective of the study 
opine that aggregate tax is relatively elastic. This is important to policy makers as it shows that aggregate tax has 
the potential to be increased to a more than proportionate level with any change in economic growth. This 
therefore means that every policy that is aimed at improving gross domestic product also increases tax to a larger 
extent. However it is worth noting that real GDP is not a significant determinant of aggregate tax. Hence the 
Nigerian aggregate tax system is good to a considerable extent, and so policies could be geared toward 
increasing this elasticity even further by strengthening the private sector to generate more tax revenue. The 2004 
tax reform was very significant and portrays a buoyant tax system. Policies like this could be structured to 
increase the tax base and the reforms could be strengthened to make it even more buoyant. 
The previous year’s tax is significant at 95% confidence interval in determining the aggregate tax 
revenue of the current period. This reflects the governments of most African countries as their budgets are 
mostly targeted just above the previous budget, without ascertaining the needs and wants of the economy and 
looking for means to increase the tax base especially in an elastic aggregate tax system like that of Nigeria as 
determined in this study. This study opines that aggregate tax is elastic to economic growth. This suggest that 
policy makers could set higher targets for aggregate tax and depend on its elastic nature to increase tax and not 
necessarily depending on the incremental budget plan.  
The other determinants considered were government expenditure, oil revenue, external grant and 
inflation. Government expenditure was not significant in determining it, though positively related. This means 
that an increase in government expenditure will increase aggregate tax and so any policy aimed at improving 
government expenditure also increases aggregate tax. Oil revenue has a significant positive impact on aggregate 
tax revenue and this implies that in as much as the country depends on oil, oil revenue still has a significant 
impact on aggregate revenue. External grant is negatively related to aggregate tax and this suggests that those 
sectors, on which external grants are made, are tax generating sectors. This might be predominant when the 
external grant is rather direct, that is in the form of finished products. Nevertheless the researcher notes that it is 
not significant. Inflation is also negatively and insignificantly related to aggregate tax revenue. This is expected 
as inflation might reduce output in the industry thereby reducing taxable companies and hence aggregate tax. 
The Value added tax (VAT) has an elasticity of 0.796 with economic growth, implying that there is a 
less than proportionate change with VAT with every change in economic growth. This therefore implies that 
favorable growth will lead to an increment in VAT though not in the same proportion. The fact that it’s a very 
significant determinant of VAT further lays emphasis on its relevance on VAT. This should however be the case 
because it is expected that economic growth breathes value addition and hence value added tax. The tax reform 
dummy suggest that after the 2004 tax reforms, VAT declined implying that the buoyancy was low, though it is 
not significant at 95% confidence interval. This however portrays that the 2004 tax reform did not lead to an 
improvement in the quantity of VAT. Interest rate being one of the determinants of VAT, suggests a negative 
and non-significant effect on VAT. This implies that VAT increases with a fall in interest rate (lending rate), 
which therefore implies that the government could increase VAT by reducing interest rate though interest rate is 
not significant as the results suggest. On the other hand, the term of trade is a positive non-significant 
determinant of VAT. This is however expected, and the government should note this positive relationship that 
term of trade has with VAT and therefore use it to improve VAT.  
The elasticity of company income tax (CIT) is very low, and insinuates that an increase in economic 
growth (proxy by GDP) leads to a less than proportionate change in the CIT. real GDP however significantly 
determines CIT at 10% significant level. Therefore must be considered considerably when drafting policies to 
induce CIT, nevertheless the elasticity is just 0.291 that implies a very slow respond to change in GDP. The tax 
reform dummy is equally not significant showing that there was no significant change after the 2004 tax reform 
on CIT, but there was a positive improvement as testified by the positive sign of the coefficient of the dummy. 
Though, it was not significant and hence not buoyant. Tax reforms should therefore be restructured to have 
significant impacts on the tax base. The other determinants indicate that interest rate is not a significant 
determinant on CIT, and that the lag of CIT is very significant in determining CIT of the current year. This 
therefore shows that CIT depends greatly on the past CIT’s.  
Petroleum profit tax has the highest elasticity with respect to VAT, CIT, and CED. The elasticity of 
2.159 suggests that an increase in economic growth increases PPT to a more than proportionate level. This could 
be used to the advantage of the state and federal governments to improve petroleum profit tax. The buoyancy 
was equally high as the 2004 tax reform dummy was significant though it had a negative impact on PPT. The lag 
of PPT did not significantly determine it at 5% significant level, just like real exchange rate and oil revenue. But 
unlike the lag of PPT that had a negative relationship with PPT, real exchange rate and oil revenue had a positive 
relationship.  
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Custom and excise duties (CED) record an elasticity that is less than 1, hence suggesting that for every 
change in real GDP, CED changes by a less than proportionate amount.  This means that CED responds slowly 
to changes in real GDP and must be noted in designing policies aimed at improving CED or as a consequence of 
every unit growth of GDP. The fact that GDP is significant also shows its contribution to CED. Also, just like 
the case with PPT, the 2004 tax reforms had a negative significant effect on CED. Hence better policies should 
be formulated bearing in mind that CED is inelastic with respect to GDP. The other determinants; real exchange 
rates, lag of CED, and imports are all not significant determinants of CED. 
 
Suggestions for further Research 
The study has gone a long way to determine the elasticity and buoyancy of aggregate tax as well petroleum profit 
tax, custom and excise duties, company income tax, and value added tax. Given that a study of this nature has 
not been carried out in Nigeria, it would therefore raise a debate in this sector and proffer solutions to improve 
the tax volume. The elasticity of other taxes could be equally investigated and other methods could be used to 
verify the elasticity and buoyancy of tax, to affirm the results gotten from this study. In addition the elasticity of 
tax with respect to other indices could also be investigated in order to know whether tax increases or decreases as 
such indices change, and to what extent. 
Also having established the elasticity and buoyancy of the afore mentioned taxes research on tax an 
related fields can be made on the premise that aggregate tax in Nigeria is relatively flexible and buoyant while of 
all the major taxes mentioned only petroleum profit tax is elastic ant the other three are inelastic. Other reforms 
and policies on tax could equally be tested for buoyancy such as this study deed for the 2004 reforms.    
 
Conclusion 
Nigeria’s potential of crude and other natural resources is uncontestable, however climate change has raised the 
debate on how sustainable oil revenue can be and hence questioned its overdependence. It is on this premise that 
this study investigated the elasticity and buoyancy of tax in an attempt to ascertain its flexibility and hence the 
possibility of increasing the tax base. The study therefore suggested that aggregate revenue is relatively elastic 
and significantly buoyant according to the 2004 tax reforms. The results of the four major taxes tested showed 
that only PPT was found to be relatively elastic while VAT, CED and CID were relatively inelastic. However the 
results further suggest that, while VAT and CIT are not significantly buoyant according to the 2004 tax reforms, 
PPT and CED are significantly buoyant. Finally, the study used the 2005 structural break to establish that 
aggregate tax revenue dropped significantly after the boom period. The study therefore concludes that tax in 
Nigeria is relatively flexible with respect to growth and therefore more could be done to increase it.  
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